In July Resilience Forward reported on the publication of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s first module, which explored resilience and preparedness in relation to the recent pandemic. In the following article, Robert Hall looks at the new approach to whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience that the report recommends.
Opening Pandora’s box
Publication of the first of nine modules by the UK Covid-19 Inquiry marked a significant moment in learning lessons from the pandemic (1). The theme of the module was the resilience and preparedness of the country: in 217 pages it summarises evidence from an array of witnesses. The report has been broadly welcomed by those involved, particularly victims and their families as a thorough examination of the issues.
This article looks at one part of the last chapter (Chapter 6), specifically that part titled ‘A new approach’ (Paragraphs 6.67-6.104). Recommendation 10 from that chapter states that: ‘The UK Government should, in consultation with the devolved administrations, create a statutory independent body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. The new body should be given responsibility for:
- providing independent, strategic advice to the UK Government and devolved administrations on their planning for, preparedness for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies;
- consulting with the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector at a national and local level and directors of public health on the protection of vulnerable people in whole-system civil emergencies;
- assessing the state of planning for, preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across the UK; and
- making recommendations on the capacity and capabilities that will be required to prepare for and build resilience to whole-system civil emergencies.
As an interim measure, the new body should be established on a non-statutory basis within 12 months of this Report, so that it may begin its work in advance of legislation being passed.’
All this should be welcomed and it will be a measure of the new UK Government as to how quickly and wholeheartedly this recommendation is adopted. It is the first official inquiry to suggest such a novel way forward when dealing with civil emergencies.
Words matter
While mentioning the word resilience 558 times in the entire report, the term surprisingly does not appear in the Glossary. Definitions are not everything but beyond the connecting words they are important in identifying the foundational elements behind the word. Without this understanding, there is the danger of false goals and actions as well as miscommunication. It is, therefore, reasonable to have expected the Inquiry to offer its interpretation.
The UK Government Resilience Framework (UKGRF) from late 2022 provides a rather narrow definition of resilience (2). A more recent document from the UK Resilience Academy provides a better context and offers definitions for both operational and strategic resilience (3). The basis is the broader ISO definition of ‘the ability to absorb, and adapt in a changing environment’ (4).
The idea of ‘adapting’ to change and associated activities is an often-overlooked element of resilience. It is, nonetheless, mentioned 26 times in the Inquiry report and the conclusion is less than positive. It states that: ‘The UK Government’s sole pandemic strategy, from 2011, was outdated and lacked adaptability.’
Adaptability is recognition of the fact that when the situation on the ground changes significantly (because of major disruption) then a reshaping and reordering of not only the specific response at the time but also the future response should be applied. This can include wide societal, economic, and health aspects that influence national resilience. Any recovery should be more than returning to the status quo ante and about modifying behaviours, processes and procedures to be ready for the next challenge over the long term. It is, therefore, about having a flexibility to bounce forward rather than necessarily an elasticity to bounce back.
Fresh thinking
Chapter 6 of the report offers some worthy ideas which could loosely be placed under the heading of adaptation: in fact, it could be described as transformational if applied in full.
The notion in Recommendation 10 of that chapter is that the Government should ‘create a statutory independent body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience’ is an important one. But, yet again, (as the Inquiry notes): ‘There is, at present, no agreed definition between the UK Government and devolved administrations about what amounts to a whole-system civil emergency. This should be rectified.’
Clearly, the most complex civil emergencies will engage the whole system of central, regional, and local government across the UK, as well as the whole of society. The ‘whole-of-society approach’ is a popular term used extensively in government literature around resilience. Once more, there is no clear indication provided as to what this should look like and who should contribute inputs to, and complete actions arising from, the proposed independent body: the UKGRF does not help here either. What the Inquiry does recommend (Chapter 2, Recommendation 1) is ‘a single Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee’ responsible for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience for each of the four nations in the UK.
One witness to the Inquiry was invited to offer ideas as to what a whole system could look like. The written answer was partially reflected in the report. Sir Oliver Letwin suggested that, under a new resilience framework, an independent National Resilience Institute (broadly based on the model of the Climate Change Committee) could be established through a National Resilience Act (based on the Climate Change Act 2008) (5). He believed an Act would confer lasting impetus for a qualified and quantified response by governments of whatever political hue, with the Institute (~35 staff) reporting to Parliament rather than ministers to counteract the tendency of short-term political interference and to create some effective mechanism outsideWhitehall and therefore outside ministerial control.
There have been other investigations and recommendations that have pointed towards a similarly independent body. Different titles have been offered to reflect preferences such as a National Resilience Committee, an Office for Preparedness and Resilience or an Office for Resilience Responsibility (6).
What all these ideas omit is the urgent need for a proper executive function, namely a meaningful organization and capacity to prepare for and manage the responses to systemic, civil emergencies. Such an organization could provide the strategic and operational heft to plan, organize, and co-ordinate a major response of any kind. This would be well beyond the limited capabilities of the current COBR Unit in Whitehall, the Resilience and Emergencies Division in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Housing (which is responsible for directly engaging with local areas), and lead government departments. The Inquiry (Chapter 2, Recommendation 2) suggests that the Government ‘abolish the lead government department model for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience’ but puts the onus on the Cabinet Office. With the other tasks the Cabinet Office has, and its limited staffing, this is unlikely to be a credible solution to large-scale activation for a potentially protracted period.
Any new arrangement would require the legal power (an Act) to determine what measures authorities took either in planning for emergency responses or in making top-level responses on the day. This does not obviate the essential responses from communities, local resilience for a, or regional partnerships but it must be able to co-ordinate the integration of the top-down and bottom-up measures across the board for national recovery.
Such an executive function, working across government departments while collaborating with other public- and private-sector organizations, could come about with the creation of a discrete new ministry or government department. A Ministry for Civil Resilience, for example, could be given the assets and staff to organize a comprehensive resilience strategy and associated activities for all risk types. The ministry would be able to incorporate Military Aid to the Civil Community and contributions from Reserve Forces as valuable components of a national emergency.
The ministry would replace the current Resilience Directorate and COBR Unit in the Cabinet Office, expand their capabilities considerably to become a strategic delivery entity for preparation, response, recovery, and regeneration. It could receive expertise and advice from the recommended independent statutory body. This transformation would require a major commitment from Government. It would also demand the creation of new entities to help with civil preparedness nationwide. We have witnessed this before in the UK’s history: organizations such as the Royal Observer Corps (a civil-defence organization), the Civil Defence Corps (a civilian volunteer organization to mobilise and take local control of an affected area in the aftermath of a major national emergency) and the Home Service Force (a guard force) have all taken their place in preparing the country in the face of a serious threat.
A role for business
A key contributor to a whole-system/society approach must be the private sector. This has the financial, scientific, manufacturing, and logistical base to help prepare for, recover from, and subsequently adapt. It was prevalent in the Covid-19 response from PPE provision to respiratory design and build, to vaccine roll-out. It will surely be prevalent in future emergencies.
However, little mention is made in the Inquiry’s report of the important role that business played in pandemic preparedness and resilience. This is disappointing but not surprising as other official reports often seem to give insufficient weight to the contribution that the private sector can bring, even when acknowledging it should be more. The public-private partnership is a critical component of national resilience.
Reference 5 (below) states that: ‘businesses and industry should play a more active role in the national planning process. Information on their levels of preparedness and ability to respond in a crisis is critical for the development of robust plans. This two-way communication is in place at a local level, but at a national level it is limited.’ Yet, that same reference heard from only four mainstream business witnesses out of a total of 85. As business owns around three-quarters of the CNI, has the largest logistical network in the country and intelligence networks outside, is on the front line in delivery, and largely wants to help, it is disappointing that more is not made of these valuable contributions placed on an equal footing, and exercised (7). The Inquiry report devotes a section and appendix to exercising but does not mention business in the list of those it recommends should be included. (Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.90)
Likewise, the Government should be clear about what the expectations may be on them in the event of a crisis. There should be a perceived value to business if they are expected to invest capital and resources to assist with national resilience. Any incentive e.g. a tax credit needs to be in place well in advance of any disruption and seen as part of a long-term strategy as the private sector operates with long-term objectives (8). However, there are significant economic benefits both for the country and corporations from investing in resilience prior to disruption. According to the Disaster Relief Alliance, for every £1 spent on preparedness, £4 is saved in emergency response when disaster hits, nevermind the better protection of supply chains and the incorporation of enhanced technologies (9).
The best way to facilitate this cross-sector engagement is through regular workshops and testing exercising. Such work can break down barriers (silos), extend the understanding of capabilities, and establish contacts that can be valuable at all times. The UK Resilience Academy may help this dialogue.
Other contributors
Besides business, there are contributions from other non-government sectors such as the voluntary, community, charity, trade union, education, religious, and sports sectors. The input from volunteers is acknowledged by the Inquiry but mentioned only once in the report’s Introduction. This is surprising as over 3,000 mutual aid groups and around 21% of people in England formally volunteered at the beginning of the pandemic (10). They could be a valuable resource in the future if registered and prepared. Tapping into the vast array of talent around the country will bring diversity as well as inclusivity for a range of perturbations not just pandemics. To be effective, however, what is needed is that co-ordinating structure which can bring all these sectors, as well as business leads, together under a combined strategy and holistic plan.
To function, prior registration would allow suitably qualified people to be called out across all four nations; any list would need to be updated regularly, no easy task. People would largely be volunteers of all ages who may need refresher training and be equipped. To incentivise and retain, some payment or tax incentive would be expected. All this will not be required on day one but could be built over time with the right impetus; it cannot sensibly be formed in the face of an imminent crisis. Limited schemes like the military’s Staff Corps or the NCSC’s Industry 100 initiative offer smaller scale models upon which plans could build over time.
There has been much talk recently of a citizen army (discrete from national service) or civil reserve that could be the repository for bringing together volunteers and interested parties (11). As with business, citizens need to be a valued part of the solution rather than regarded as part of the problem. Giving young people a stronger voice in decision-making at all levels of governance could be powerful (12). An expanded National Citizen Service would be beneficial here (13). Other countries offer viable and tested models here to replicate or adapt to UK circumstances.
Deeds not words
The Inquiry report sets a high benchmark for the new Government to attain. The idea of ‘A new approach’ is to be welcomed but must be implemented in full if the UK is to have a much better opportunity to recover from future pandemics and other serious crises which could incur major loss of life. With talk of a pre-war situation evolving, this is all the more important. The next crisis will never be the same as the last one, but we must learn lessons from the past and adapt our present structures to be better prepared. This will not come easily or cheaply but will may immense dividends – and avoid another costly inquiry.
The author
Robert Hall is cofounder and former Executive Director of Resilience First. He is now an independent consultant, writer and speaker. He is the author of Building Resilient Futures (ISBN: 9781035812622, Austin Macauley, 2023).
Notes and references
- UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Module1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, 18 July 2024.
- The UK Government Resilience Framework, 19 December 2022, defines resilience as: ‘The UK’s ability to anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from natural hazards, deliberate attacks, geopolitical instability, disease outbreaks, and other disruptive events, civil emergencies or threats to our way of life.’
- Organisational Resilience Guidance for UK Government Departments, Agencies and Arm’s Length Bodies (ALBs), Version 1, UK Defence Academy, August 2024. The Inquiry states (Paragraph 5.120) that: ‘… there is, as yet, no commitment to a full, published analysis setting out recommendations to improve preparedness and resilience; no analysis of the costs of assuming the risks as against the benefits of taking steps to mitigate the risks; and no particular regard to how vulnerable people will be protected. There is no implementation plan and there are no deadlines against which performance may be objectively judged.
- Security and resilience – Vocabulary. ISO 22300:2021. See also Hall R, Anticipate, absorb, adapt: the ‘Triple A’ of resilience, Resilience Forward, 1 August 2024.
- Witness Statement by Rt Hon Sir Oliver Letwin, 24 April 2023.
- HoL Select Committee on Risk Assessment and Risk Planning, Report of Session 2021-22 Preparing for Extreme Risks: Building a Resilient Society. The report recommended that: ‘The Government should establish an Office for Preparedness and Resilience as a non-departmental body, headed by a newly created post of Government Chief Risk Officer. This body would be responsible for producing independent analysis of UK preparedness and monitoring Government preparedness.’
- Hall, R. Submission to HoC Liaison Committee inquiry on promoting national strategy: How select committee scrutiny can improve strategic thinking in Whitehall, 23 May 2024.
- A Blueprint for Resilience in 2035. Webinar organized by Cityforum on 18 July 2024. A conference of the same name was held in May 2024.
- Disaster Relief Alliance.
- A look at volunteering during the response to COVID-19, HM Government, 11 January 2021.
- Speech by General Sir Patrick Saunders to International Armoured Vehicles Conference, 22 January 2024.
- Navigating New Horizons, UNEP report, 2024.
- A new CEO for the NCS is being sought after the incumbent decided to step down in July 2024.
