By Sam Peters
The UK Government’s proposal to ban ransomware payments across public sector organizations, including councils, schools, the NHS, and critical infrastructure providers, is a bold step in tackling cybercrime. For too long, ransomware operators have profited from a ‘pay-and-forget’ culture, exploiting organizations with no alternative recovery plan. Cutting off the financial incentive makes sense in theory, but the reality is far more complex.
Cybercriminals will continue targeting vulnerable systems regardless of whether payment is an option. Without a strong strategy for resilience, public sector bodies could face prolonged downtime, severely disrupting essential services. The attack on the Irish Health Service Executive in 2021 was a stark example of how refusing to pay a ransom does not eliminate disruption. The health service faced weeks of operational paralysis and the recovery costs of hundreds of millions of euros. Meanwhile, incidents like the Travelex breach in 2020 highlighted the dangers of paying ransoms. Despite handing over millions, the company still suffered delays and reputational damage. Payment does not guarantee a swift resolution and often encourages further attacks.
Beyond a ban
The Government’s consultation on ransomware proposes three measures: a targeted ban on ransom payments for the public sector, a requirement for private organizations to report payment intentions before proceeding, and mandatory incident reporting for all victims. While these measures aim to deter attacks and improve intelligence-sharing, they also present challenges.
A complete ban on ransom payments for public sector organizations is intended to remove the financial incentive for cybercriminals, but without sufficient investment in resilience, these organizations may be left unable to recover quickly. Many councils and NHS trusts are already dealing with outdated infrastructure and cybersecurity staff shortages. If they are expected to withstand ransomware attacks without the option of paying, they must be given the funding and resources to build stronger defences and response plans.
The requirement for private organizations to report payment intentions before proceeding introduces another layer of oversight, which could help authorities track ransomware trends. However, this approach risks delaying critical decisions in high-pressure situations. If an organization needs urgent access to its systems to maintain essential services, a delay caused by regulatory reporting could increase the damage. There is also the possibility that some businesses may avoid disclosure, undermining the intended benefits of the policy.
Mandatory reporting of ransomware incidents is an important step in building a clearer understanding of the threat landscape, but concerns remain about how organizations will respond. Many may fear reputational damage or regulatory scrutiny, leading to underreporting. If this policy is to be effective, the Government must ensure that reporting mechanisms offer practical support rather than punitive consequences.
Building resilience with structured security frameworks
Rather than focusing solely on banning payments, organizations should prioritise preventing attacks and ensuring they have robust recovery strategies. Implementing recognised security frameworks, such as ISO 27001, provides a structured approach to managing risks and responding effectively to incidents.
ISO 27001 helps organizations integrate security into their daily operations, rather than treating it as an afterthought. By systematically identifying vulnerabilities, public sector bodies can strengthen their defences and reduce the likelihood of falling victim to an attack. The framework’s emphasis on regular testing and monitoring ensures that threats are detected early, limiting the potential damage.
One of the most critical aspects of resilience is business continuity. ISO 27001 places significant focus on incident response planning, ensuring that organizations have a clear and tested strategy for restoring services. This is especially crucial for public sector bodies that cannot afford prolonged disruption. By having a well-prepared recovery plan, organizations can avoid being forced into the difficult decision of whether to pay a ransom simply to get back online.
The changing role of cyber insurance
Another important consideration is how the proposed ban may affect cyber insurance. Many policies currently cover ransom payments as part of incident resolution, but if payments are prohibited, insurers may withdraw coverage or significantly alter their offerings. Organizations without a strong security posture could find it harder to obtain cyber insurance, placing them at even greater financial risk if an attack occurs.
Those that can demonstrate adherence to security frameworks like ISO 27001 may have an advantage when negotiating insurance coverage. A clear, structured security strategy reassures insurers that an organization is taking proactive steps to mitigate risks. This not only strengthens an organization’s ability to withstand cyber threats but may also help secure more favourable insurance terms.
Moving forward
The UK Government’s proposal signals a strong stance against ransomware, but banning payments alone will not solve the problem. Public sector organizations need a comprehensive approach that includes investment in cybersecurity infrastructure, workforce training, and the widespread adoption of structured security frameworks.
Cyber resilience should not be an afterthought or a compliance exercise, but an integral part of how organizations operate. By focusing on prevention, early detection, and recovery, businesses and public sector bodies can make ransomware a less viable business model for cybercriminals. However, if the Government is serious about disrupting ransomware operations, it must match its tough talk with meaningful investment in cybersecurity across the board. Without proper funding and support, this ban risks punishing victims more than the criminals who target them.
The author
Sam Peters is Chief Product Officer at ISMS.online






